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Abstract 
Ever-increasing numbers of human interactions with intelligent software 
agents, online and offline, and their increasing ability to influence humans 
have prompted a surge in attention toward the concept of (online) 
manipulation. Several scholars have argued that manipulative influence is 
always hidden. But manipulation is sometimes overt, and when this is 
acknowledged the distinction between manipulation and other forms of 
social influence becomes problematic. Therefore, we need a better 
conceptualisation of manipulation that allows it to be overt and yet clearly 
distinct from related concepts of social influence. I argue that manipulation 
is careless influence, show how this account helps to alleviate the 
shortcomings of the hidden influence view of manipulation, and derive 
implications for digital ethics.  
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We increasingly interact with intelligent machines, online and offline (Floridi 
2014). According to several scholars, many of those interactions are manipulative 
(e.g. Frischmann and Selinger 2018; Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2019b; 
Zuboff 2019; Klenk In press). This critical perspective on interactions with 
intelligent machines is part of a wider social and scholarly development that views 
human-machine interactions as often deeply problematic instances of “techno-
social engineering”, that is, as “processes where technologies and social forces 
align and impact how we think, perceive, and act” in worrisome ways (Frischmann 
and Selinger 2018, 4). Going beyond concerns about lack of fairness in exchanges, 
human interactions with intelligent machines appear to be of a much more 
worrisome nature: they seem deeply manipulative, with drastic consequences for 
human well-being and autonomy (Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2019b).  
Questions about manipulation occupy an important place in the debate about 
the ethics of (digital) behavioural technologies. Behavioural technologies are 
technologies designed to change, or support change in, human behaviour. For 
example, the health app ‘Headspace’ aims to support users with meditations and 
the shift toward a more mindful lifestyle. Behavioural technologies raise ethical 
questions about the legitimacy of the behaviour they aim to support, but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, about the legitimacy of the type of influence they have 
on users. Digital behavioural technologies – with their comparatively cheap 
‘deployment’ costs, wide availability, and potential to optimise their means of 
influencing by learning from data – only exacerbate the urgency of these questions. 
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Questions about manipulation are important for this debate in at least two 
ways. First, digital behavioural technologies can be studied as tools wielded by 
humans or firms, and questions about manipulation would concern whether these 
tools are used in a manipulative way. Second, digital behaviour technologies – 
which sometimes operate autonomously (such as a recommender system designed 
to keep users engaged) – may themselves be considered as agents of manipulation. 
This may be the case because they embody ethical characteristics (Klenk 2020), or 
because they are indeed agents in a relevant sense. In any case, it can be asked 
whether digital behavioural technologies are themselves manipulative or whether 
they are used as tools in a manipulative way.  
In light of the controversy surrounding our interactions with machines and 
the relevance of manipulation for the ethics of behavioural technologies, it 
becomes crucial to understand what manipulation is, so that problematic types of 
interactions can be distinguished from unproblematic ones. In the popular 
understanding of manipulation (e.g. Merriam-Webster 2020), and several recent 
contributions to the debate in digital ethics from a philosophical (Susser, Roessler, 
and Nissenbaum 2019b, 2019a) and legal perspective (Zarsky 2019), the view is 
that covertness is a necessary component of manipulation. Call this the covertness 
thesis: 
Covertness thesis: Manipulation is hidden influence.  
However, despite its intuitive appeal, prominence, and influence, the 
covertness thesis is false. Hidden influence is not a necessary component of 
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manipulation.1 One possible counterexample against the covertness thesis is a 
manipulative guilt trip, and there are many others (as I will show below). Yet, 
rejecting the covertness thesis leads to a hitherto unnoticed problem about 
demarcating manipulation from other forms of social influence, notably coercion. 
Therefore, the challenge is to rectify the conception of manipulation used in digital 
ethics, while maintaining a useful distinction from other forms of social influence.  
In this paper, I explain why the covertness thesis is initially attractive but 
ultimately false, in a way that goes beyond counterexamples by raising the novel 
demarcation problem. I then demonstrate how to overcome the demarcation 
problem by introducing a suitable account of manipulative action as a form of 
careless influence. The paper thus provides a deeper understanding of 
manipulation and its application to digital ethics and should be of interest to 
philosophers, economists, and legal scholars studying the ethical implications of 
digitalisation.  
I proceed as follows. First, I introduce the covertness thesis in more detail. I 
partly cover familiar territory here, but I also add something new by showing how 
the covertness thesis helps to avert a dilemma about manipulation. Then I show 
why the covertness thesis fails. I use counterexamples as well as deeper theoretical 
and practical arguments. Finally, I propose a way out of the problem by arguing 
that manipulative action is always careless influence.  
 
1 Neither is it a sufficient one. For example, consider that you might simply fail to attend to 
someone’s influence on you, even though your interlocutor does not aim to hide their influence from 
you. Such cases (e.g. a nurse assisting in an operation on you) are not manipulative. I will not focus 
on the sufficiency of covertness for manipulation in what follows, because its proponents present 
the covertness thesis as describing a necessary condition.  
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1 Thesis: Manipulation as hidden influence 
According to a popular and increasingly influential view, manipulation is a type 
of social influence that is necessarily covert. We will see in this section that the 
covertness thesis implies that some form of deception is necessary for 
manipulation. Recall, the covertness thesis is as follows: 
Covertness thesis: Manipulation is hidden influence.  
A normatively more loaded formulation of the covertness thesis would hold 
that manipulation is trickery, or that it always involves cunning, a ruse, ploy, or 
subterfuge. As all of these types of interpersonal interaction at bottom involve 
hidden influence, I leave it to the reader to interpret the covertness thesis in his 
or her favourite terms.2 
The covertness thesis has been defended by several scholars, in the literature 
in normative ethics and digital ethics. In an early conceptual analysis of 
manipulation, Joel Rudinow (1978) suggests that manipulation is a special form 
of social influence precisely because it is hidden (1978, 339): 
Both persuasion and coercion seem to be open in seeking to influence 
behavior, whereas manipulation seems in some way more mysterious about 
it. 
Rudinow does not go on to provide a more explicit defence of the covertness 
of manipulation since his interests lie elsewhere. Like Rudinow, several other 
normative ethicists hint at the link between manipulation and covert influence. 
Teun van Dijk defines manipulation as a process of social influence that “happens 
 
2 Of course, on the covertness thesis, manipulation is not just hidden influence. Additional 
(necessary and sufficient) factors account for some influence being manipulative. But these 
additional factors shall not concern us in what follows as I will focus exclusively on covertness as 
an alleged necessary requirement of manipulation. 
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without the awareness of the recipients” (van Dijk 1998, 276). Robert Goodin 
(1980, 9) attests that manipulation contains an element of deviousness. Marcia 
Baron suggests, in a somewhat weaker claim, that manipulation “typically” works 
best if hidden and that the manipulator, if at all possible, aims to keep the 
manipulation hidden from the manipulatee (Baron 2003, 39). Alan Ware hints at 
the covertness thesis to distinguish manipulation from education (Ware 1981, 
171). In recent discussions of manipulation in legal contexts, the covertness thesis 
has also often played a prominent role (Sunstein 2016a; Zarsky 2019). Even 
though the endorsement of the covertness thesis remains somewhat implicit, I 
take the views cited above as evidence that there is much sympathy for the view 
represented by the covertness thesis in discussions of manipulation in normative 
ethics.  
In digital ethics, the covertness thesis has been defended much more 
explicitly and forcefully, notably by Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum (2019a, 
2019b). In what follows, I will primarily draw on their account to flesh out the 
details and implications of the covertness thesis. Susser et al. write that 
“manipulation is hidden influence.” They express the view that covertly 
influencing someone is manipulation (Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2019b, 
4). They further specify (Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2019b, 4): 
Covertly influencing someone—imposing a hidden influence—means 
influencing them in a way they aren’t consciously aware of, and in a way 
they couldn’t easily become aware of were they to try and understand what 
was impacting their decision-making process. 
The view could be either that manipulation requires successfully making it 
the case that one’s influence remains hidden, or merely intending it to be so. The 
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difference is one of success: in analogy, I can successfully make it the case that you 
are happy, or merely intend you to be happy. Susser et al. go for the former, more 
demanding option. They specify as follows (Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 
2019b, 5): 
Strictly speaking we would only say that they have succeeded in 
manipulating when their target is unaware of their machinations. 
Thus, the proper interpretation of the covertness thesis is that manipulation 
is defined by successfully hidden influence. For example, the Trojan horse scheme 
will count as a case of manipulation, partly because it turns out to be successful. 
Had the scheme failed, it would have been an attempt only and would thus not 
count as manipulation, according to the covertness thesis.3 
The covertness thesis carries an intriguing and, thus far, largely unnoticed 
connection to another prominent view of manipulation, the view that 
manipulation always involves deception, or the manipulation-as-deception view 
for short (cf. Gorin 2014, 74ff. for critical discussion). The covertness thesis and 
the manipulation-as-deception view are not obviously equivalent because 
‘deception’ is itself a loaded normative concept, which is sometimes interpreted 
narrowly in aetiological terms. In that case, hidden influences do not per se 
constitute deception (that is, a hidden influence need not lead to false beliefs in 
the manipulatee). But there is a broader and more plausible interpretation of 
deception which shows that the covertness thesis indeed implies the 
 
3 Of course, this leaves open the possibility that unintentionally but covertly influencing 
someone can count as manipulation. But that does not seem right for reasons that are beyond the 
scope of this paper, and so it seems that intentionally hiding one’s influence and succeeding is what 
makes for manipulation. For reasons of space, I shall not pursue this issue in what follows.  
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manipulation-as-deception view. Let us then trace the connection from the 
covertness to the deception view.  
Note first that the covertness thesis implies that manipulation requires 
deception, in the sense that the manipulator deceives about his or her aims or 
means of influence, which raises the following question: Does deceiving about one’s 
aims or means of influence count as deception? Plausibly, the answer is yes. 
Manipulation, according to the covertness thesis, requires the manipulatee to be 
lead astray about the intentions and means of influence of the manipulator. But 
leading someone astray about one’s intentions is deceptive, on a plausible 
interpretation of ‘deception’ and so the covertness thesis entails the manipulation-
as-deception view.4  
Therefore, if the covertness thesis is true, then there cannot be manipulation 
without deception, broadly construed. Manipulation in these cases relies on the 
fact that subjects form no attitude or a false attitude about the manipulator’s 
intentions and that plausibly counts as deception (Fallis 2009).5 Being clear about 
the entailment will be important when assessing the covertness thesis. As we will 
see below, insofar as there can be non-deceptive manipulation (broadly construed), 
the covertness thesis must fail.  
Though I will later attack the covertness thesis, it is important to emphasise 
its attractiveness. First and foremost, it seems to capture very well the ordinary 
 
4 Of course, deception narrowly construed as intentionally causing false beliefs in one’s 
victim may thus be a proper subset of manipulation, and so there can be manipulation without 
deception narrowly construed (cf. Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2019b; Cohen 2018; Krstić 
and Saville 2019). 
5 (Gorin 2014, 79) defends a similar conclusion in reference to a “transparency norm” that 
requires “that an interactive partner not hide her intentions in interacting when these intentions 
are relevant to the intentions or interests of the person with whom she is interacting.”  
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user of the term of manipulation, which makes it intuitively compelling.6 More 
importantly, it is theoretically useful in distinguishing manipulation from other 
forms of social influence, notably coercion and persuasion. In contrast to 
persuasion and coercion, which Susser et al. consider to be “forthright concepts”, 
they claim that “manipulation is hidden – we only learn that someone was trying 
to steer our decision-making after the fact if we ever find out at all” (Susser, 
Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2019b, 4).  
It helps to pause here for a moment for a digression on broader normative 
methodology. When we define manipulation, we are partly charting the field of 
social influence, specifically by setting manipulation in relation to other types of 
social influence like persuasion and coercion (and, of course, there is the option 
that some turn out to be just the same). The covertness thesis allegedly has the 
strength of helping us succeed at this task because it gives us a good criterion to 
distinguish manipulation from other types of social influence. This task of 
distinction occupies all analysts of manipulation (cf. Ware 1981, 171).  
The contrast that seems most relevant in drawing the boundary of 
manipulation is between manipulation and coercion. It is commonly assumed that 
manipulated people are still acting autonomously or out of their free will, even 
though their agency may be somewhat diminished because of the manipulative 
influence (cf. van Dijk 1998, 274; Wood 2014). But the assumption of a continuum 
of autonomy in the victim between manipulation (some agency) and coercion 
 
6 Most compellingly, it invokes the image of the puppeteer who pulls the strings of his puppet 
in the background. 
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(much less or even no agency) raises a deep puzzle: Where can we legitimately and 
firmly draw a line between both concepts, if not through the criterion of agency?  
The covertness thesis helps us answer that question. Indeed, the most 
significant factor in favour of the covertness thesis is that it helps us to avoid what 
I call the demarcation dilemma for theories of manipulation. Suppose coercion 
involves curtailing the agency or autonomy of the coerced person. That assumption 
gains plausibility from the fact that coerced people are usually, at least partly, 
exculpated for their actions because they did not act in the proper sense (cf. Wood 
2014). Now, manipulation also involves influence and, more than that, a degree of 
control by the manipulator, so that the manipulatee is steered towards the 
manipulator’s aims. There is thus a certain sense in which manipulation also 
seems to involve undermining the manipulatee’s agency. That is aptly captured in 
the popular image of a puppet master pulling the strings (or pushing the emotional 
buttons) of his or her unsuspecting victims, leading to determined outcomes. 
However, if the influence were not successfully hidden, then it would seem that 
the manipulatee would willingly engage in the behaviour. This would raise the 
question of explaining what is wrong with that behaviour. If the manipulatee does 
not willingly engage in the behaviour, then the manipulatee is not in the strict 
sense acting at all, and we would be talking about coercion, the annihilation of 
agency, and not manipulation.7 So, manipulation might just as well disappear as 
a phenomenon in the wake of the demarcation dilemma.  
 
7 More precisely, coercion annihilates choice and deprives the coerced person of her self-
chosen ends. In a limited sense, however, she still acts in giving in to coercion. I thank [omitted for 
blind review] for discussion on this point. Manipulated behaviour, on my view, is less free 
behaviour, though not necessarily less agentive behaviour. The defence of that view must wait for 
another paper, however.  
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The covertness thesis offers a helpful way out by disallowing that overt 
influences count as manipulation. Therefore, the covertness thesis seems to be in 
good standing theoretically, not only because of its intuitive plausibility but also 
because of the important and straightforward solution to the demarcation 
dilemma it provides.  
There are practical benefits to the covertness thesis, too. The covertness 
thesis explains well why many journalists, academics, and members of the wider 
public are now concerned with manipulation in the wake of online technologies: 
there seem to be new vulnerabilities and power hierarchies such that hidden 
influence is much more likely in this context and, thus, there is fertile ground for 
manipulation. Indeed, as commentators have documented at great length, the 
potential and actual degree of knowledge over human users and subsequent 
influence exerted on human users by intelligent machines is quite dramatic 
(Kramer, Guillory, and Hancock, J. 2014; Burr and Cristianini 2019; Burr, 
Cristianini, and Ladyman 2018). Crucially, what critics often highlight is the 
subtlety and covertness with which we are influenced online. For example, in their 
discussion of how technology “re-engineers” humans, Frischmann and Selinger 
(2018) put much emphasis on the fact that much of it happens subtly, aided by 
now ubiquitous surveillance technologies. 
 These are important observations because they point to the practical 
significance of the covertness thesis: people are concerned about hidden influence. 
That might be a surface-level effect of deeper concerns about autonomy and 
rational decision-making (both of which, arguably, are hampered by hidden 
influences, though see Klenk and Hancock, J. 2019). Nonetheless, starting from 
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the view that there is a problem with online influence, the covertness thesis 
partially explains and indeed justifies the recent concern with digital technologies.  
With the covertness thesis in place, we could focus our efforts on identifying 
the other components of manipulation, with the required policy recommendations 
following suit. However, as I will show next, the covertness thesis fails.  
2 Antithesis: Overt manipulation 
So far, I have introduced the covertness thesis of manipulation, connected it to the 
important manipulation-as-deception view, and emphasised its theoretical 
advantages. Rather than merely covering familiar territory, I have highlighted an 
often neglected theoretical advantage of the Covertness view, which is that it 
avoids the demarcation dilemma for theories of manipulation. But in this section, 
I will show that the covertness thesis cannot be correct. First, I will show that 
there are counterexamples to it. Second, I will show that the covertness thesis has 
problematic implications that speak against it independently of whether one 
accepts the relevancy of the offered counterexamples or not.  
Some manipulation is overt. For example, consider the following case from 
Barnhill (2014, 60): 
Janice has booked a vacation trip to New York City. Janice’s father, Mike, 
doesn’t want her to go because he thinks that New York City is too 
dangerous a place. Over the course of a weekend together, Mike repeatedly 
says things like, “If you go, your mother and I will be sick with fear!” 
knowing that this will make Janice feel extremely guilty. Mike thinks that 
it’s appropriate for Janice to feel extremely guilty for making her parents 
worry so much. This makes Janice feel very guilty and as a result, she 
cancels the trip. 
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Such manipulative guilt trips can be “plain as the day,” according to Barnhill 
(2014, 60).8 Hence, hidden influence is not necessary for manipulation. One might 
resist this conclusion by pointing out that Barnhill’s case does not clearly involve 
harm done to the manipulatee, and so fails to qualify as manipulation. But 
consider the following case from Gorin (2014, 80–81): 
Wilson and Adams are up for promotion, though only one of them will get 
the job. Wilson is a recovering alcoholic and Adams sets out to encourage a 
relapse, intending this to disqualify Wilson for the promotion. Adams 
consistently drinks alcohol in front of Wilson, offers her alcoholic beverages, 
vividly describes to her whatever benefits there are to drinking and to 
drunkenness, and so on, all the while making no secret of his intentions. 
During a moment of weakness brought on by a particularly difficult and 
stressful event Adams takes a drink, which leads to more drinks, missed 
days at work, and an overall decreased ability to meet the demands of her 
job. When the time comes to announce who will be promoted, Adams is told 
by her managers that her recent poor performance has made it impossible 
for them to give her the new job and that they have selected Wilson for the 
promotion. 
Clearly, Adam’s behaviour is manipulative, but it does not seem to involve 
deception or hidden influence at all. An analogous case from the digital realm 
illustrates the point even more convincingly, given the ubiquity of comparable 
situations:  
Zaire works in online marketing and advises clients on social media 
marketing strategies. She is well aware and indeed an expert in online 
behavioural targeting. As her 30th birthday approaches, she sees more and 
more targeted advertisements for baby products online. So far, she did not 
plan on having kids and did not concern herself with the topic. But although 
she does her best to ignore this obvious marketing effort, she begins to doubt 
that she should not have kids.  
 
8 We can even imagine that Janice is very well aware why Mike puts up a such a show – it 
might be common knowledge between them, or Mike might at some point even admit his ulterior 
motives. Janice would likely react as she does all the same, especially if Mike is also sincere about 
his act. Thanks to [omitted for review] for this suggestion.  
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The marketing efforts seem manipulative, despite Zaire being well aware of the 
underlying process of influence. The ulterior intention behind the marketeer’s 
influence, a profit motive, is plain as the day to Zaire and yet she seems 
manipulated (that fact about ulterior motives might have been obscured in earlier 
cases, but it isn’t in this case). Indeed, the fact that the ads prove effective despite 
her being aware of it seems particularly pernicious about this example (a point to 
which I will return below). Is that perhaps because these two cases involve 
affective influence, one that the victim is not properly aware of after all? Even if 
that were the case, that explanation is not available for the following two cases: 
During World War II, American soldiers would fight only if it was common 
knowledge that other soldiers would not defect. Knowing that the American 
soldiers were racially divided, Japanese propagandists claimed that all 
African American (AA) defectors will be well treated. Although the Japanese 
realized that the AA soldiers knew both that they would not be well treated 
and that this was just a trick meant to plant distrust within their ranks, the 
Japanese hoped that white soldiers would not know that the AA soldiers 
knew this. And even if none of the white soldiers was racist, they would 
believe that some of their white comrades were racists. The mere spectre of 
racism was enough to undermine the common knowledge that AA soldiers 
would not defect. As a result of this general distrust, the AA units were 
withdrawn, and the Japanese succeeded in reducing American troop 
strength. 
In this case by Krstić and Saville (2019), the Americans were manipulated, 
despite the fact that they were not deceived by the Japanese and that they were 
aware of the scheme in terms of its affective influence (concretely, that there was 
an appeal to racist tendencies). Going digital again makes it straightforward to 
find a suitable case from everyday experience:  
Marianne is an avid Twitter user and she has a ‘folk theory’ about the 
functioning of the algorithm that curates her Twitter feed. Like many others 
(cf. DeVito et al. 2018), she believes that the algorithm will prioritise and 
show content to her that is emotionally activating and that appeals to 
problematic affective tendencies like in-group favouritism. She’s a moderate 
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Republican and well aware that the more radical people she follows on 
Twitter aim to push her emotional buttons. Still, she can’t help but feel 
heightened resentment toward the media and the Left after browsing 
Twitter.  
Marianne is not deceived about the intentions of the right-wing radicals on 
Twitter. Yet, she seems manipulated.9 In all five cases, we can observe social 
influence that is plausibly characterised as manipulation even though the 
influence is by no means hidden. Hence, these are counterexamples to the 
covertness thesis and, therefore, the covertness thesis must be false. 
It is methodologically undesirable to bank one’s case entirely on 
counterexamples that appeal to intuition. But there is more support for the case 
against the covertness thesis. Some authors like Wood (2014) have recorded a 
particular moral aversion against overt manipulation. In a discussion of 
manipulative advertising, which Wood argues often involves no deception, Wood 
finds the “fact that we are manipulated even without actually being deceived more 
appalling than reassuring” (Wood 2014, 38). The acuteness of Wood’s moral 
assessment is beside the point for present purposes; what matters is that the 
normative qualms with blatant, overt manipulation are clearly intelligible and 
relevant. But the covertness thesis cannot make sense of this idea at all. If the 
covertness were true, then such an assessment would exhibit conceptual 
inaptitude, a failure to understand what manipulation really is. But responding 
to Wood in such fashion – pointing out that what he finds morally abhorrent is not 
really manipulation – seems misguided precisely for the reason that there are 
 
9 As noted in the introduction, it is an interesting further question whether we can 
reasonably describe the Twitter algorithm as manipulative (in addition to, or instead of, the 
creators of the content). I address this question in (ref omitted for review).  
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cases of overt manipulation. Of course, one could claim that we are dealing with 
coercion here (following from the continuum thesis), but that does not seem 
plausible either.  
These cases of manipulative interaction have already been discussed in the 
literature, though often not explicitly as a case against the covertness thesis.10 It 
is important to explicitly address the covertness thesis in light of two 
considerations. First, insights that have long been gained in debates about 
normative ethics should also be considered in the increasing literature in digital 
ethics about (online) manipulation, where they are currently missing from the 
debate. Second, doing so helps to raise and then solve a neglected issue, the 
shifting of the conditions of manipulation from the manipulator to the 
manipulatee, as discussed below, which is a direct consequence of accepting the 
covertness thesis.  
We can now turn to the problematic implications of the covertness thesis. The 
following fundamental theoretical problem with the covertness thesis is 
independent of the counterexamples presented above and the intuitions one may 
or may not have about them. The covertness thesis implies the following:  
Covertness counterfactual: Had the manipulatee uncovered the hidden 
influence, it would not have been manipulation.  
To illustrate, if a sneaky car salesperson tries to appeal to a buyer’s sense of 
pride (e.g., ‘imagine what your colleagues would think if they see you in that car!’) 
to upsell the buyer – thus showing manipulative intent – and the buyer uncovers 
 
10 For critical discussion of the requirement that manipulation be covert, see also Gorin 
(2014, 74ff.); (Barnhill 2014, 59ff.), (Noggle 1996, 43–55), (Fischer 2017, 45ff.). 
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the attempted hidden influence, then there is no manipulation, according to the 
covertness thesis. But that counterfactual is both conceptually and morally 
problematic.  
The conceptual problem is that the covertness counterfactual misallocates 
the grounding facts of manipulation from the agent (the manipulator) to the 
patient (the potential manipulatee). By ‘grounding facts’, I mean the natural facts 
that determine whether a given action counts as manipulation or not. Presumably, 
what makes a given action a case of manipulation is, amongst other things, what 
the actor does (e.g., Iago scheming, the car-salesman triggering, etc.) and not how 
the patient is reacting to the agent’s action. But this is just what the covertness 
counterfactual implies: it says that we have a case of manipulation only if the 
manipulatee fails to respond in a certain way (namely, by uncovering the hidden 
influence) to the manipulator’s action. To be clear: though it is, of course, true that 
the patient will to some extent determine whether manipulation happens (e.g. 
whether the patient is harmed by the manipulative action, or whether he or she 
consents to it), it is false that the existence of manipulation counterfactually 
depends on the patient’s reactions to the agent’s action.  
The conceptual problem with the covertness thesis is further accentuated by 
luck in manipulation cases. The covertness counterfactual implausibly implies 
that a lucky uncovering of the manipulator’s hidden influence would make the 
manipulation disappear. At the very least, the covertness thesis leaves open how 
to proceed with cases that turn out to be manipulation by sheer luck, i.e., where 
the manipulatee almost happened to uncover the hidden influence.  
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The conceptual problem leads on to a moral problem for the covertness thesis. 
The covertness counterfactual suggests the manipulatee might have the ability to 
prevent the manipulation from happening in cases in which he or she can uncover 
the influence. It is plausible that in such cases the manipulatee has an obligation 
to prevent the manipulation from happening. But that suggests that cases of 
manipulation can involve a moral failing by the victim of the manipulation. That, 
however, seems to be the wrong conclusion to draw and, therefore, the covertness 
counterfactual – and hence the covertness thesis – must be false.  
Finally, note that there is a significant practical problem that follows from 
the covertness counterfactual. That is that policy recommendations might just too 
easily come down on the wrong side of things. The view demands either less 
covertness from would-be manipulators or more awareness from would-be 
manipulatees. Concrete policy proposals will be more likely to go the route of less 
resistance, and educating the public, rather than legislating the perpetrators, will 
often be more politically feasible. But it is undoubtedly the wrong conclusion to 
draw from noticing a large amount of manipulation that we should educate the 
public more, at least insofar as this is understood as potentially completely 
eradicating manipulation, as implied by the covertness thesis.  
Proponents of the covertness thesis have two plausible replies. First, they 
could weaken their thesis as follows: 
Covertness*: Manipulation is attempted hidden influence.  
That concession would avoid the conceptual and the moral problem because 
the covertness counterfactual would no longer hold. In that respect, it seems a 
plausible option for proponents of the covertness thesis to take. However, some of 
19 
 
the proponents of the covertness thesis explicitly reject Covertness* (Susser, 
Roessler, and Nissenbaum 2019b). Also, that concession weakens support for the 
popular and influential view, discussed above, that the actual increase in hidden 
influence is a sign of manipulation. So, this is not a good option to take for 
proponents of the covertness thesis. 
Second, proponents of the covertness thesis could distinguish between into 
manipulativeness and manipulated behaviour, and claim to talk about 
manipulated behaviour all along, which depends primarily on the patient. I am 
sympathetic to this response, and it is similar to some other recent accounts of 
manipulation in the literature (e.g. Klenk In press). But that is not a response on 
behalf of the covertness thesis because, again, the covertness thesis, if anything, 
is a view about manipulative behaviour, not manipulated behaviour. After all, that 
seems to be the reason why proponents of the covertness thesis often allude to the 
self-interested intentions of the creators of intelligent machines (e.g. Zuboff 2019).  
Therefore, the covertness thesis is in deep trouble. It implies a conceptually 
problematic counterfactual which, in turn, has troublesome moral and practical 
implications. One could weaken the covertness thesis, but only at the cost of giving 
up its initial attractiveness. It would, therefore, seem like rejecting the covertness 
thesis and admitting that manipulation is only sometimes, but not necessarily, 
hidden is the only way out.  
But we must not forget the demarcation dilemma. Rejecting the covertness 
thesis seems right from one perspective, but would throw us right onto one of the 
horns of the demarcation dilemma, and thus threaten us with abandoning 
manipulation as a clearly demarcated phenomenon altogether. Resolving this 
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tension will require an account of manipulation (or, to be precise, of at least one 
necessary condition of it) that avoids the pitfalls of the covertness thesis while at 
the same time showing how manipulation differs from coercion.  
The main aim of this paper has been to raise this challenge and to bring it 
into sharper relief. The implications are clear for the field of digital ethics. An 
account of manipulation is sought that avoids the pitfalls of the covertness thesis 
without blurring the line to other types of social influence, notably coercion. In 
developing such an account, it will be interesting to see whether the seemingly 
striking feature of current machine-human influence – the subtlety and covertness 
of influence – can be left out of the definition of manipulation and yet one will find 
the currently dominant view of increased online manipulation vindicated. We will 
turn to such an account next.   
3 Synthesis: Manipulation as careless influence 
Let us briefly take stock. We have seen that the covertness thesis is appealing and 
plausible but that it succumbs to objections. The immediate problem that follows 
from the argument against the covertness thesis is that we have lost a way to 
distinguish manipulation from other forms of social influence, such as coercion. In 
this section, I introduce and defend an alternative account of manipulation and 
demonstrate how it helps to demarcate manipulation from coercion.  
I defend the view that manipulation is careless influence. More precisely: 
Manipulative action: M aims to manipulate a patient S if and only if  




b) M disregards whether m reveals eventually existing reasons for S to do, 
think, or feel for b to S. 
Manipulative action thus understood requires the manipulator to 
intentionally employ some way of influencing the target to bring about a form of 
behaviour in the target, together with a lack of intention to reveal to the target 
any reasons that might exist to act in accordance with the manipulator’s aims.  
A typical manipulative action according to my account has the manipulator 
thinking roughly as follows: ‘I want you to perform behaviour b, so I do action m, 
and I would have chosen m even if it did not reveal your reasons for doing b to you.’ 
Naturally, this is but a gloss, and the italicised consideration need not be conscious 
to the manipulator. The manipulator intends his or her influence to have a 
particular effect on the manipulatee and chooses his influence accordingly, but he 
or she does not care whether the chosen means of influence reveal any reasons for 
exhibiting the intended behaviour to the manipulatee.11  
Importantly, the necessary criterion for manipulative action is not that the 
manipulator is careless about whether the manipulatee has reasons to perform 
the desired action (e.g. the car-salesmen caring about whether the manipulatee 
has reasons to buy that car). Rather, the focus is on eventually existing reasons 
that are potentially revealed through the manipulator’s chosen means of influence. 
We have a case of manipulation if and only if the manipulator does not care 
whether his or her means of influence reveals eventually existing reasons to the 
 
11 Note that the account lends itself to a counterfactual analysis – but not about the 
effectiveness of the influence (along the lines of ‘had I not used manipulative method M, S would 
not have done p’) but rather in terms of the propensity of the chosen method of influence to reveal 
reasons to the influenced person. See (MS ref omitted) for discussion. Thanks to [omitted] for 
comments on this point. 
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manipulatee. Therefore, the proposed account is quite distinct from influential but 
problematic, accounts of manipulation in terms of reason-undermining (e.g. 
Noggle 1996; Baron 2003; Beauchamp and Childress 2008; Blumenthal-Barby and 
Burroughs 2012). 
Some manipulators like parents and liberal paternalist choice architects do 
care about a manipulatee’s reasons for exhibiting the intended behaviour, but they 
do not care about revealing these reasons through their chosen method of 
influence. Parents may not care to appeal to the grounds of an action but instead 
opt for other means that maximise the likelihood of the action getting done because 
their children do not sufficiently grasp reasons yet (Kohlberg and Mayer 1972). 
Paternalist choice architects may not aim for increasing their subjects’ insights 
because other means of influencing are more effective (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). 
In both cases, whether or not there are reasons for the manipulatee to act, and 
whether they are revealed through the chosen method, is a mere side-effect. The 
factor that turns both cases into cases of manipulative action is the fact that the 
agent in each case exercises careless influence – careless in the sense that the 
agent is not concerned with choosing a means of influence that may be reason-
revealing to the patient.  
The proposed account of manipulative action thus defends necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an action to count as manipulative. I will henceforth refer 
to the account as the MACI view, because it defines Manipulation As Careless 
Influence. Naturally, a moral question arises in response to manipulative action 
as defined by the MACI view, namely whether manipulation – or careless 
influence – is morally permissible. I suspect that it often is, as in cases where 
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parents interact with younger children, but I shall not pursue that question in 
what follows. It is important to keep in mind that the discussion of manipulation 
can proceed on the assumption that manipulation – in itself – is not a moralised 
or negatively connotated concept (cf. Coons and Weber 2014). The MACI account 
aims to capture what is distinct about manipulation. It captures well the intuitions 
recorded by philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis of the concept of 
manipulation.  
Though this is not the place to demonstrate this through a case-by-case 
analysis, it is helpful to briefly contrast the MACI account with Cass Sunstein’s 
account of manipulation, because there are important parallels and differences.12 
Sunstein suggests that an action is manipulative “to the extent that it fails to 
sufficiently engage or appeal to [the manipulatee’s] capacity for reflection and 
deliberation” (Sunstein 2016b, 82, 2016a). Sunstein’s account and the MACI 
account will often coincide (that is, provide classifications of a social influence as 
manipulative). When you are careless about how you influence someone (which 
counts as manipulative according to MACI), you may also fail to sufficiently 
engage or appeal to that person’s capacity for reflection and deliberation (which 
counts as manipulative on Sunstein’s account).  
However, there is no material or substantive connection between both views, 
and I will highlight just two differences. First, Sunstein construes manipulation 
overly narrow in terms of a (sufficient) lack to engage deliberation and reflection. 
But many influences that do not at all aim to engage deliberation and reflection 
are not manipulative, contra Sunstein’s account (cf. Barnhill 2016). MACI 
 
12 Thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasising the link to Sunstein’s account.  
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recognises that we often have perfectly good reason for non-deliberative and 
unreflective thoughts, emotions, and behaviour. Failing to care about revealing 
those reasons is manipulative, not the fact that one does not aim to make them 
available for reflection and deliberation. Second, the MACI account is not just a 
broader (and more accurate) version of Sunstein’s account, but it is fundamentally 
different. Sunstein’s account relies on an implicit theory about appropriate 
influence to identify manipulation, whereas the MACI account allows us to 
identify manipulation in a non-moralised fashion and to use a theory about 
appropriate influence to evaluate the moral status of manipulation. The MACI 
account thus avoids a negatively connotated concept of manipulation and it still 
maintains the idea that the wrongness of manipulation can be a graded affair, 
even though an action just is or isn’t manipulative.  
With the distinction to Sunstein’s account drawn, it should suffice to say that 
the five cases of manipulation recounted in the previous section, though vastly 
different, all turn out correctly to be cases of manipulation according to MACI. 
Note, however, that MACI does not tell us what it is to be manipulated. So, the 
MACI view can be completed as a view on manipulation only with a corresponding 
view about the nature of manipulated action. Existing discussions of manipulation 
rarely point out that there might be a difference between the two and yet most end 
up focusing on manipulative action almost exclusively. It is thus in continuation 
with existing work that the account at hand focuses on manipulative action, 
although I hasten to add that some commentators have been calling for a theory 
of manipulated action (Klenk and Hancock, J. 2019). With that caveat, we can 
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return to the question of how the MACI view resolves the tensions created by the 
reaction of the covertness thesis.  
We should begin by noting that the MACI view saves an important intuition 
behind the covertness thesis. It saves the idea that there is something worrisome 
or problematic about being left in the dark on issues that concern one’s life. 
Manipulation is intuitively worrying because it often does leave its victim in the 
dark about the bigger picture in which he or she acts. People seem generally 
uncomfortable with this idea, even if they get evidence that they would be better 
off as an effect of being left in the dark about aspects of their treatment (cf. Meyer 
et al. 2019). The covertness thesis can easily capture that intuition. But so can the 
MACI view. In contrast to the covertness thesis, however, MACI locates the 
problem not in the de facto unawareness of intentions or influences (which is not 
required for manipulation, as shown above), but in the intentional lack of care of 
the manipulator to help the victim to an insight into the bigger picture of his or 
her action.  
The MACI view also evades the demarcation problem. It allows us to sharply 
demarcate manipulation form other forms of social influence by defining 
manipulation broadly. Manipulation, on this view, is a broad category that may 
well encompass instances of coercion. That is not a problem. Nobody has said how 
the demarcation should be done, only that it is needed. Coercion may thus be a 
form of manipulation, distinguished from manipulation by involving further 
components such as the use of force and the diminishing of agency.  
The MACI view also overcomes the conceptual, moral, and practical problems 
raised for the covertness thesis discussed above. The MACI view overcomes the 
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conceptual problem because it makes manipulation counterfactually dependent on 
the actor’s actions and intentions, but not those of the patient. This is exactly as 
desired, as per the earlier discussion. With the counterfactual rectified, the moral 
problem thus vanishes as well. There is also no practical problem. 
Therefore, the MACI view allows us to successfully distinguish manipulation 
from other forms of social influence while at the same time avoiding the 
conceptual, moral, and practical pitfalls of the covertness thesis. That is a good 
result.  
Before turning to a broader implication of the MACI view for digital ethics 
and specifically the debate about the ethics of digital behavioural technologies, it 
is prudent to address two potential objections to the MACI view. First, critics 
might object that the proposed account falls prey to the same problem that befalls 
the covertness thesis because the account makes manipulation depend entirely on 
the perpetrating agent. If that is the case, then we determine whether something 
is manipulative solely by looking at the perpetrator and, therefore, we violate an 
intuition about the two-sidedness of the manipulation relation. However, the 
objection misinterprets the criticism of the covertness thesis. The covertness thesis 
gave rise to a problematic counterfactual that implied that the manipulatee’s own 
action instantiates the manipulation. That is not the case for the MACI view. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the practical problem above does not arise, 
because the MACI view asks us to focus on the perpetrators which is, arguably, 
the correct response to cases of manipulation.  
Second, and more fundamentally, critics might object that the ‘careless 
influence’ idea appears to make manipulation not very demanding in the sense 
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that quite a lot of social influences may come out as manipulative. Whenever an 
actor does not care whether his or her chosen means of influence help the patient 
to see their reasons for action, then that action will count as manipulative. 
Notably, the MACI view invites us to view very many economic interactions as 
manipulative because the seller does not aim at revealing the buyer’s reasons. 
However, this is not necessarily a problem for the view because the view does not 
imply that everything that is manipulative is also problematic (all things 
considered). As suggested above, we should resist the temptation to view 
manipulation as a negatively connotated concept from the start. 
With the improved view on manipulation at hand, we can now look ahead at 
some broader implications of the MACI view for current digital ethics. One 
important implication concerns the reasons for taking seriously the possibility or 
threat of manipulation by or through digital behavioural technologies. As noted in 
the introduction, some scholars suggest that manipulation is a particularly 
problematic and widespread phenomenon in the online sphere. The MACI view 
may confirm that suspicion, though for reasons altogether different than those 
that have been offered so far. Recall that the covertness thesis seemed a 
formidable view partly because it could make sense of the intuition that there is 
something wrong with intelligent machines that subtly and covertly influence 
humans.  
In light of the preceding argument, however, the alleged subtlety and 
covertness (insofar as it exists) is not per se a problem. Recalcitrant intuitions to 
the effect that there is indeed something wrong with these digital behavioural 
technologies, however, are not necessarily misguided. They may point to the fact 
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that intelligent machines influence us in a careless fashion, and perhaps even 
necessarily so, as Klenk (In press) has recently argued. If that view is along the 
right lines, then the problem is not that machines are influencing us in a particular 
way, but rather the (lack of) reason for why they are doing so.  
Thus, the ethical problem with manipulation by or through digital behaviour 
technologies is not that technology offers even greater potential for hidden 
influence (though that may be true as well, especially for those with low 
technological literacy). Rather, the problem is that many of those influences may 
not be aimed at revealing reasons to users. These influences would qualify as 
manipulative, and they would not enhance people’s ability to act in reason-
responsive ways.  
For the debate in digital ethics, this means that more attention should be 
paid to the grounds that determine which particular techno-social influences are 
applied to humans. For example, why are reminders and notifications (which are 
particular types of techno-social influences) used in applications such as health-
care apps like ‘Headspace’ or social media platforms? Are they intended to increase 
engagement, no matter what? Or are they intended to show the users that there 
are indeed reasons to follow suit with the desired behaviour, e.g., do a mediation 
or check one’s messages? The former case would count as manipulative, according 
to MACI, but the latter would not.  
Of course, there are difficult methodological questions about how to 
determine the intentions behind a given techno-social influence to determine 
whether it is manipulative or not, and it can be shown that there are sound and 
satisfactory approaches (ref omitted for review). In short, as long as a method of 
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influence (e.g., a notification, a particular design, or salient picture) is chosen 
because it reveals reasons to the user, then the influence is reason-oriented and 
not manipulative. This can be assessed using counterfactual reasoning. For 
example, it can be asked whether the designers of the ‘Headspace’ app would have 
chosen ‘Mindful Moments’ push-messages had they not revealed reasons for being 
mindful to users. If the answer is ‘no’ (e.g., because they introduced that feature 
to maximise engagement with the app, for commercial reasons) then those 
influences are manipulative.  
Once we turn our attention to the manipulativeness of digital behavioural 
technologies themselves (that is, when we consider them to be agents of 
manipulation, after having settled the relevant question outlined in the 
introduction), we can ask whether machines even have the capacity to aim to 
reveal reasons to human users. Since most artificially intelligent machines cannot 
even comprehend causality (Pearl and Mackenzie 2018), let alone the more 
intricate ‘reason for’ relation, there looms a principled obstacle for non-
manipulative influence by machines.  
Admittedly, much more has to be said about how to assess manipulation on 
the MACI account in concrete cases. For the purposes of this paper, however, the 
important result is that investigations of manipulation (in digital behaviour 
technologies) must look for (lack of) reason-orientation in the sense just sketched 
rather than the existence of hidden influences. A lack of reason-orientation should 
count for manipulation, and, therefore, raise further questions about appropriate 
moral and political reactions. Whether the influence is hidden or not, however, is 
not of primary interest.  
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4 Conclusion  
Must social influence be covert to be considered manipulation? The question is 
important amid increased efforts to understand what manipulation is, especially 
in the light of advances in digital behavioural technologies. The covertness thesis 
implies that manipulation must be covert. However, the covertness thesis is false. 
There is overt manipulation, but it is always a form of careless influence. The 
paper has demonstrated the problems for the covertness thesis, both through 
counterexamples and by revealing a deeper theoretical problem with its 
implications for dealing with manipulation, and then discussed a superior 
alternative. It has shown that an account introduced at length elsewhere has 
superior features and is able to resolve the tensions around the carelessness 
account.  
Though much of the argument has focused on the concept of manipulation, 
there are important links to the debate about the ethics of (digital) behavioural 
technologies. We can assess these technologies both in terms of their consequences 
or effects on human individuals and groups, but also in terms of the value of the 
nature of their influence on us. In order to enable such an analysis, which, it 
stands to reason, might reveal ethical problems and opportunities specific to 
digital behavioural technologies, we need an understanding of manipulation. We 
need that understanding to be able to classify whether a given influence counts as 
manipulative or not. We can then assess whether humans or organisations 
manipulate via digital behavioural technologies and whether those technologies 
may themselves do the manipulating. The account of manipulation as careless 
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influence has shown that the intention of actors to reveal reasons to the people 
they influence determines whether they act manipulatively or not.  
Future work needs to extend the critical analysis begun here to further 
components of manipulation, eventually aiming to provide a full list of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. In particular, it seems promising to follow-up on the 
distinction between manipulated action and manipulative action, where very little 
has been done so far on the former concept, but which might prove to be of utmost 





Barnhill, Anne. 2014. “What Is Manipulation?” In Coons and Weber 2014. 
Barnhill, Anne. 2016. “I’d Like to Teach the World to Think: Commercial 
Advertising and Manipulation.” JMB 1 (3-4): 307–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1561/107.00000020. 
Baron, Marcia. 2003. “Manipulativeness.” Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 77 (2): 37. https://doi.org/10.2307/3219740. 
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. 2008. Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics. 6. ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Blumenthal-Barby, J. S., and Hadley Burroughs. 2012. “Seeking Better Health 
Care Outcomes: The Ethics of Using the "Nudge".” The American journal of 
bioethics 12 (2): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2011.634481. 
Burr, Christopher, and Nello Cristianini. 2019. “Can Machines Read Our 
Minds?” Minds & Machines 83 (5): 1098. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-019-
09497-4. 
Burr, Christopher, Nello Cristianini, and James Ladyman. 2018. “An Analysis of 
the Interaction Between Intelligent Software Agents and Human Users.” 
Minds and machines 28 (4): 735–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-018-9479-0. 
Cohen, Shlomo. 2018. “Manipulation and Deception.” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 96 (3): 483–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1386692. 
Coons, Christian, and Michael Weber. 2014. “Manipulation: Introduction.” In 
Coons and Weber 2014, 1–16. 
33 
 
Coons, Christian, and Michael Weber, eds. 2014. Manipulation: Theory and 
Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
DeVito, Michael A., Jeremy Birnholtz, Jeffery T. Hancock, Megan French, and 
Sunny Liu. 2018. “How People Form Folk Theories of Social Media Feeds and 
What It Means for How We Study Self-Presentation.” In CHI 2018: 
Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems : April 21-26, 2018, Montréal, QC, Canada /  Sponsored by ACM 
SIGCHI, edited by Regan Mandryk, Mark Hancock, Mark Perry, and Anna 
Cox, 1–12. New York, New York: The Association for Computing Machinery. 
Accessed September 07, 2020. 
Fallis, Don. 2009. “What Is Lying?” Journal of Philosophy, 29–56. 
Fischer, Alexander. 2017. Manipulation: Zur Theorie Und Ethik Einer Form Der 
Beeinflussung. Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Floridi, Luciano. 2014. Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere Is Reshaping 
Human Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press USA. 
Frischmann, Brett M., and Evan Selinger. 2018. Re-Engineering Humanity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goodin, Robert E. 1980. Manipulatory Politics. New Haven CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Gorin, Moti. 2014. “Towards a Theory of Interpersonal Manipulation.” In Coons 
and Weber 2014, 73–97. 
34 
 
Klenk, Michael. In press. “Digital Well-Being and Manipulation Online.” In 
Digital Well-Being, edited by Christopher Burr and Luciano Floridi. Accessed 
November 17, 2019. 
Klenk, Michael. 2020. “How Do Technological Artefacts Embody Moral Values?” 
Philos. Technol., 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-020-00401-y. 
Klenk, Michael, and Jeff Hancock. 2019. “Autonomy and Online Manipulation.” 
Internet Policy Review. https://policyreview.info/articles/news/autonomy-and-
online-manipulation/1431. Accessed February 28, 2020. 
Kohlberg, Lawrence, and Rochelle Mayer. 1972. “Development as the Aim of 
Education.” Harvard Educational Review 42 (4): 449–96. 
https://doi.org/10.17763/haer.42.4.kj6q8743r3j00j60. 
Kramer, Adam D. I., Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeff Hancock. 2014. “Experimental 
Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks.” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 111 (29): 8788–8970. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1412469111. 
Krstić, Vladimir, and Chantelle Saville. 2019. “Deception (Under Uncertainty) 
As a Kind of Manipulation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 830–
35. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1604777. 
Merriam-Webster. 2020. “"Manipulation".” Accessed February 27, 2020. 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manipulation. 
Meyer, Michelle N., Patrick R. Heck, Geoffrey S. Holtzman, Stephen M. 
Anderson, William Cai, Duncan J. Watts, and Christopher F. Chabris. 2019. 
“Objecting to Experiments That Compare Two Unobjectionable Policies or 
35 
 
Treatments.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 116 (22): 10723–28. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1820701116. 
Noggle, Robert. 1996. “Manipulative Actions: A Conceptual and Moral Analysis.” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1): 43–55. 
Pearl, Judea, and Dana Mackenzie. 2018. The Book of Why: The New Science of 
Cause and Effect. New York: Basic Books. 
Rudinow, Joel. 1978. “Manipulation.” Ethics 88 (4): 338–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/292086. 
Sunstein, Cass R. 2016a. “Fifty Shades of Manipulation.” Journal of Behavioural 
Marketing 213. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2565892. 
Sunstein, Cass R. 2016b. The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of 
Behavioral Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Susser, Daniel, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum. 2019a. “Online 
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World.” Georgetown Law 
Technology Review 4 (1): 1–45. Accessed February 27, 2020. 
Susser, Daniel, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum. 2019b. “Technology, 
Autonomy, and Manipulation.” Internet Policy Review 8 (2): 1–22. 
https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.2.1410. 
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2009. Nudge [Electronic Resource]: 
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness /  Richard H. 




van Dijk, Teun A. 1998. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
Ware, Alan. 1981. “The Concept of Manipulation: Its Relation to Democracy and 
Power.” British Journal of Political Science 11 (2): 163–81. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/193581. 
Wood, Allen W. 2014. “Coercion, Manipulation, Exploitation.” In Coons and 
Weber 2014, 17–50. 
Zarsky, Tal Z. 2019. “Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age.” Theoretical 
Inquiries 20: 157–88. Accessed February 27, 2020. 
Zuboff, Shoshana. 2019. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a 
Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. 
 
